Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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dc.contributor.authorEngelmann, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorFischbacher, Urs
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-26T09:37:29Z
dc.date.available2022-07-26T09:37:29Z
dc.date.issued2009eng
dc.description.abstractWe study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006eng
dc.identifier.ppn303409355deu
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11986.2
dc.language.isoengeng
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dc.subjectIndirect reciprocity, Reputation, Experimental economicseng
dc.subject.ddc004eng
dc.subject.jelC92
dc.titleIndirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Gameeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
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  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006},
  title={Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game},
  number={2},
  volume={67},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={399--407},
  author={Engelmann, Dirk and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
kops.citation.iso690ENGELMANN, Dirk, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2009. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. In: Games and Economic Behavior. Elsevier. 2009, 67(2), pp. 399-407. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006deu
kops.citation.iso690ENGELMANN, Dirk, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2009. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. In: Games and Economic Behavior. Elsevier. 2009, 67(2), pp. 399-407. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006eng
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kops.sourcefield.plainGames and Economic Behavior. Elsevier. 2009, 67(2), pp. 399-407. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006eng
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