Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorKaas, Leo
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:42:55Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:42:55Zdeu
dc.date.issued2003deu
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers an endogenous growth model with productive government spending in which overlapping generations of agents vote sequentially on policy. With sequential majority voting, there is a multiplicity of politico-economic equilibria originating from self-fulfilling policy expectations. Some of these equilibria are Pareto-inefficient and there are endogenous cycles. A constitutional rule providing partial commitment significantly shrinks the set of politico-economic equilibria, removing all inefficiencies and cycles. However, a likely outcome is that government size is too high relative to the growth maximizing size.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfdeu
dc.identifier.citationFirst publ. in: European Journal of Political Economy, 19 (2003), 2, pp. 227-246deu
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4
dc.identifier.ppn312469284deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/12136
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2009deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectGrowthdeu
dc.subjectFiscal policydeu
dc.subjectPolitical economydeu
dc.subjectOverlapping generationsdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelD72; E62;deu
dc.titleProductive government spending, growth, and sequential votingeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
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  year={2003},
  doi={10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4},
  title={Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting},
  number={2},
  volume={19},
  journal={European Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={227--246},
  author={Kaas, Leo}
}
kops.citation.iso690KAAS, Leo, 2003. Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting. In: European Journal of Political Economy. 2003, 19(2), pp. 227-246. Available under: doi: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4deu
kops.citation.iso690KAAS, Leo, 2003. Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting. In: European Journal of Political Economy. 2003, 19(2), pp. 227-246. Available under: doi: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4eng
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kops.sourcefieldEuropean Journal of Political Economy. 2003, <b>19</b>(2), pp. 227-246. Available under: doi: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4deu
kops.sourcefield.plainEuropean Journal of Political Economy. 2003, 19(2), pp. 227-246. Available under: doi: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4deu
kops.sourcefield.plainEuropean Journal of Political Economy. 2003, 19(2), pp. 227-246. Available under: doi: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4eng
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