Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design

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dc.contributor.authorKragl, Jenny
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anja
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-30T10:15:16Z
dc.date.available2015-01-30T10:15:16Z
dc.date.issued2012eng
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.ppn425582922
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29679
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper Series / Department of Economics
dc.rightsterms-of-use
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dc.subjectJob Design, Limited Liability, Minimum Wage, Moral Hazard, Multitasking, Performance Measurementeng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.subject.jelM51
dc.subject.jelM52
dc.subject.jelM54
dc.subject.jelD82
dc.subject.jelD86
dc.titleWage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Designeng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPEReng
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kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber2012‐36eng
kops.citation.bibtex
@techreport{Kragl2012Floor-29679,
  year={2012},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design},
  number={2012‐36},
  author={Kragl, Jenny and Schöttner, Anja}
}
kops.citation.iso690KRAGL, Jenny, Anja SCHÖTTNER, 2012. Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Designdeu
kops.citation.iso690KRAGL, Jenny, Anja SCHÖTTNER, 2012. Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Designeng
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temp.internal.duplicates<p>Möglicherweise Dublette von: </p><a href="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29279">http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29279</a><p>Letzte Überprüfung: 29.01.2015 10:54:51</p>deu

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