Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design

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2012
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Kragl, Jenny
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We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Job Design, Limited Liability, Minimum Wage, Moral Hazard, Multitasking, Performance Measurement
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ISO 690KRAGL, Jenny, Anja SCHÖTTNER, 2012. Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design
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@techreport{Kragl2012Floor-29679,
  year={2012},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design},
  number={2012‐36},
  author={Kragl, Jenny and Schöttner, Anja}
}
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