Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

dc.contributor.authorDertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
dc.contributor.authorWey, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-26T08:27:04Z
dc.date.available2021-04-26T08:27:04Z
dc.date.issued2020eng
dc.description.abstractWe re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer–retailer trading relationship. O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always the case when bundling contracts are feasible). We show that the unbundling of contracts also leads to downward distorted output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost substitutability (diseconomies of scope).eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/53481
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.rightsterms-of-use
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dc.subjectVertical restraints, Bundling, Buyer powereng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.titleMulti-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer powereng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
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@article{DertwinkelKalt2020Multi-53481,
  year={2020},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936},
  title={Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power},
  volume={188},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  author={Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian},
  note={Article Number: 108936}
}
kops.citation.iso690DERTWINKEL-KALT, Markus, Christian WEY, 2020. Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power. In: Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936deu
kops.citation.iso690DERTWINKEL-KALT, Markus, Christian WEY, 2020. Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power. In: Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936eng
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kops.sourcefieldEconomics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, <b>188</b>, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936deu
kops.sourcefield.plainEconomics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936deu
kops.sourcefield.plainEconomics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936eng
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source.bibliographicInfo.articleNumber108936eng
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source.periodicalTitleEconomics Letterseng
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