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Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

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2020

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Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936

Zusammenfassung

We re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer–retailer trading relationship. O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always the case when bundling contracts are feasible). We show that the unbundling of contracts also leads to downward distorted output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost substitutability (diseconomies of scope).

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330 Wirtschaft

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Vertical restraints, Bundling, Buyer power

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ISO 690DERTWINKEL-KALT, Markus, Christian WEY, 2020. Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power. In: Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936
BibTex
@article{DertwinkelKalt2020Multi-53481,
  year={2020},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936},
  title={Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power},
  volume={188},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  author={Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian},
  note={Article Number: 108936}
}
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