Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian

Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2020

Autor:innen

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus

Wey, Christian

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936

Zusammenfassung

We re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer–retailer trading relationship. O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always the case when bundling contracts are feasible). We show that the unbundling of contracts also leads to downward distorted output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost substitutability (diseconomies of scope).

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Vertical restraints, Bundling, Buyer power

Zitieren

ISO 690

DERTWINKEL-KALT, Markus, Christian WEY, 2020. Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power. In: Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2020, 188, 108936. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936

BibTex

@article{DertwinkelKalt2020Multi-53481,
  year={2020},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108936},
  title={Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power},
  volume={188},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  author={Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian},
  note={Article Number: 108936}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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