Debt shifting and ownership structure

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2012
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Schjelderup, Guttorm
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Zusammenfassung

Previous theoretical studies on the debt shifting behavior of multinationals have assumed affiliates of multinationals to be wholly owned. We develop a model that allows a multinational firm to determine both the leverage and ownership structure in affiliates endogenously. A main finding is that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates and therefore a less tax-efficient financing structure. This is due to an externality that arises endogenously in our model, where costs and benefits of debt shifting are shared asymmetrically between minority and majority owners. Our findings provide a theory framework for recent empirical findings.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Multinationals, Tax-efficient financing structures, Minority ownership
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ISO 690SCHINDLER, Dirk, Guttorm SCHJELDERUP, 2012. Debt shifting and ownership structure. In: European Economic Review. Elsevier. 2012, 56(4), pp. 635-647. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.02.015
BibTex
@article{Schindler2012shift-18174.2,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.02.015},
  title={Debt shifting and ownership structure},
  number={4},
  volume={56},
  issn={0014-2921},
  journal={European Economic Review},
  pages={635--647},
  author={Schindler, Dirk and Schjelderup, Guttorm}
}
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