Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorGoldlücke, Susanne
dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-06T13:39:10Z
dc.date.available2018-12-06T13:39:10Z
dc.date.issued2018-11eng
dc.description.abstractA principal’s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent. The principal may be a pollution-generating firm, the agent may be a nearby town. The principal offers a contract to the agent, who has the right to be free of pollution. Then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution. Finally, a production level and a transfer payment are implemented. Suppose there is an upper bound (possibly zero) on payments that the agent can make to the principal. In the second-best solution, there is underproduction for low cost types, while there is overproduction for high cost types. In contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements, there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first-best solution.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedde
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005eng
dc.identifier.ppn514909420
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/44175
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectCoasian contracting, Negative externalities, Hidden information, Limited liability, Overproductioneng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.subject.jelD86
dc.subject.jelD82
dc.subject.jelD23
dc.subject.jelD62
dc.subject.jelH23
dc.titlePollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded paymentseng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEde
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Goldlucke2018-11Pollu-44175,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005},
  title={Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments},
  volume={110},
  issn={0014-2921},
  journal={European Economic Review},
  pages={211--222},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.}
}
kops.citation.iso690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2018. Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments. In: European Economic Review. 2018, 110, pp. 211-222. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005deu
kops.citation.iso690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2018. Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments. In: European Economic Review. 2018, 110, pp. 211-222. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005eng
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