Publikation:

Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments

Vorschaubild

Dateien

Goldluecke_2-11f617ep2qekk4.pdf
Goldluecke_2-11f617ep2qekk4.pdfGröße: 623.97 KBDownloads: 1258

Datum

2018

Autor:innen

Schmitz, Patrick W.

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-11f617ep2qekk4
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Link zur Lizenz

CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Hybrid

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

European Economic Review. 2018, 110, pp. 211-222. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005

Zusammenfassung

A principal’s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent. The principal may be a pollution-generating firm, the agent may be a nearby town. The principal offers a contract to the agent, who has the right to be free of pollution. Then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution. Finally, a production level and a transfer payment are implemented. Suppose there is an upper bound (possibly zero) on payments that the agent can make to the principal. In the second-best solution, there is underproduction for low cost types, while there is overproduction for high cost types. In contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements, there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first-best solution.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Coasian contracting, Negative externalities, Hidden information, Limited liability, Overproduction

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2018. Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments. In: European Economic Review. 2018, 110, pp. 211-222. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005
BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2018-11Pollu-44175,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005},
  title={Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments},
  volume={110},
  issn={0014-2921},
  journal={European Economic Review},
  pages={211--222},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/44175">
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>Schmitz, Patrick W.</dc:creator>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/44175"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2018-12-06T13:39:10Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:title>Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments</dcterms:title>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/44175/1/Goldluecke_2-11f617ep2qekk4.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2018-11</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2018-12-06T13:39:10Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">A principal’s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent. The principal may be a pollution-generating firm, the agent may be a nearby town. The principal offers a contract to the agent, who has the right to be free of pollution. Then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution. Finally, a production level and a transfer payment are implemented. Suppose there is an upper bound (possibly zero) on payments that the agent can make to the principal. In the second-best solution, there is underproduction for low cost types, while there is overproduction for high cost types. In contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements, there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first-best solution.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:contributor>Schmitz, Patrick W.</dc:contributor>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:creator>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/44175/1/Goldluecke_2-11f617ep2qekk4.pdf"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen