Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model

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dc.contributor.authorBreitwieser, Maria
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-01T10:45:33Z
dc.date.available2016-02-01T10:45:33Z
dc.date.issued2015eng
dc.description.abstractThe presented paper offers a simple search model of the labor market to explain the empirical findings on the role of reciprocity for labor market outcomes as reported by Dohmen et al. (2009). In an agency setting where profit-maximizing firms compete for heterogeneous reciprocal workers, with full information about workers’ types, reciprocal workers who are willing to engage in gift exchange are approached by more firms, get higher wages and exert higher efforts than selfish workers.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.ppn454867301
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/32778
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper Series / Department of Economics
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dc.subjectreciprocity, gift exchange, competitive search equilibrium, optimal contracts, wage differentials, unemploymenteng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.subject.jelD03
dc.subject.jelD21
dc.subject.jelE24
dc.subject.jelJ31
dc.subject.jelJ64
dc.titleOptimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Modeleng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPEReng
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kops.citation.bibtex
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  author={Breitwieser, Maria}
}
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