Publikation: Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model
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2015
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Zusammenfassung
The presented paper offers a simple search model of the labor market to explain the empirical findings on the role of reciprocity for labor market outcomes as reported by Dohmen et al. (2009). In an agency setting where profit-maximizing firms compete for heterogeneous reciprocal workers, with full information about workers’ types, reciprocal workers who are willing to engage in gift exchange are approached by more firms, get higher wages and exert higher efforts than selfish workers.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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reciprocity, gift exchange, competitive search equilibrium, optimal contracts, wage differentials, unemployment
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undefined / . - undefined, undefined
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BREITWIESER, Maria, 2015. Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search ModelBibTex
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author={Breitwieser, Maria}
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