A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality

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dc.contributor.authorFink, Fabian
dc.contributor.authorScholl, Almuth
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-25T13:32:52Z
dc.date.available2016-01-25T13:32:52Z
dc.date.issued2016eng
dc.description.abstractIn times of sovereign debt crises, International Financial Institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies. This paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs. Conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy. In the model, the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation. Quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short-run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long-run. Increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump-shaped pattern of sovereign default risk.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007eng
dc.identifier.ppn1885512015
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/32693
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.subjectSovereign debt, bailouts, quantitative modeleng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.subject.jelE44, E62, F34
dc.titleA quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionalityeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Fink2016quant-32693,
  year={2016},
  doi={10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007},
  title={A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality},
  volume={98},
  issn={0022-1996},
  journal={Journal of International Economics},
  pages={176--190},
  author={Fink, Fabian and Scholl, Almuth}
}
kops.citation.iso690FINK, Fabian, Almuth SCHOLL, 2016. A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality. In: Journal of International Economics. 2016, 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007deu
kops.citation.iso690FINK, Fabian, Almuth SCHOLL, 2016. A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality. In: Journal of International Economics. 2016, 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007eng
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kops.sourcefieldJournal of International Economics. 2016, <b>98</b>, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of International Economics. 2016, 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of International Economics. 2016, 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007eng
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