Publikation:

A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality

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2016

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1904wjghevbp46
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007
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Journal of International Economics. 2016, 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007

Zusammenfassung

In times of sovereign debt crises, International Financial Institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies. This paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs. Conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy. In the model, the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation. Quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short-run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long-run. Increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump-shaped pattern of sovereign default risk.

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330 Wirtschaft

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Sovereign debt, bailouts, quantitative model

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ISO 690FINK, Fabian, Almuth SCHOLL, 2016. A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality. In: Journal of International Economics. 2016, 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007
BibTex
@article{Fink2016quant-32693,
  year={2016},
  doi={10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007},
  title={A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality},
  volume={98},
  issn={0022-1996},
  journal={Journal of International Economics},
  pages={176--190},
  author={Fink, Fabian and Scholl, Almuth}
}
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