Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers
| dc.contributor.author | Englmaier, Florian | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-02T08:21:11Z | deu |
| dc.date.available | 2012-05-02T08:21:11Z | deu |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the riskiness of the tournament. In these situations a manager's type may serve as a substitute for delegation via contracts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers, firms can escape the rat race nature of R&D tournaments. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Publ. in: Managerial and Decision Economics ; 32 (2011), 1. - pp. 63-69 | deu |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/mde.1518 | deu |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/19097 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | deu |
| dc.legacy.dateIssued | 2012-05-02 | deu |
| dc.rights | terms-of-use | deu |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ | deu |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | deu |
| dc.title | Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers | eng |
| dc.type | JOURNAL_ARTICLE | deu |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @article{Englmaier2011Commi-19097,
year={2011},
doi={10.1002/mde.1518},
title={Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers},
number={1},
volume={32},
issn={0143-6570},
journal={Managerial and Decision Economics},
pages={63--69},
author={Englmaier, Florian}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | ENGLMAIER, Florian, 2011. Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | ENGLMAIER, Florian, 2011. Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518 | eng |
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| kops.identifier.nbn | urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-190977 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield | Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, <b>32</b>(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518 | eng |
| kops.submitter.email | oleg.kozlov@uni-konstanz.de | deu |
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| source.bibliographicInfo.toPage | 69 | |
| source.bibliographicInfo.volume | 32 | |
| source.identifier.issn | 0143-6570 | |
| source.periodicalTitle | Managerial and Decision Economics |
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