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Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers

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2011

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-190977
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1518
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Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518

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This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the riskiness of the tournament. In these situations a manager's type may serve as a substitute for delegation via contracts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers, firms can escape the rat race nature of R&D tournaments.

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ISO 690ENGLMAIER, Florian, 2011. Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2011, 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1518
BibTex
@article{Englmaier2011Commi-19097,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.1002/mde.1518},
  title={Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers},
  number={1},
  volume={32},
  issn={0143-6570},
  journal={Managerial and Decision Economics},
  pages={63--69},
  author={Englmaier, Florian}
}
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