On the acceptance of apologies

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorFischbacher, Urs
dc.contributor.authorUtikal, Verena
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-30T10:16:31Zdeu
dc.date.available2014-01-30T10:16:31Zdeu
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractAn apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses an apology strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.citationGames and Economic Behavior ; 82 (2013). - S. 592-608deu
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/26123
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2014-01-30deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectApologydeu
dc.subjectIntentionsdeu
dc.subjectExperimentdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelC91, D82, D83deu
dc.titleOn the acceptance of apologieseng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
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@article{Fischbacher2013accep-26123,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003},
  title={On the acceptance of apologies},
  volume={82},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={592--608},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Utikal, Verena}
}
kops.citation.iso690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Verena UTIKAL, 2013. On the acceptance of apologies. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 82, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003deu
kops.citation.iso690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Verena UTIKAL, 2013. On the acceptance of apologies. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 82, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003eng
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kops.sourcefieldGames and Economic Behavior. 2013, <b>82</b>, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003deu
kops.sourcefield.plainGames and Economic Behavior. 2013, 82, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003deu
kops.sourcefield.plainGames and Economic Behavior. 2013, 82, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003eng
kops.submitter.emailurs.fischbacher@uni-konstanz.dedeu
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