Publikation:

On the acceptance of apologies

Vorschaubild

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2013

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-261235
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 82, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003

Zusammenfassung

An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses an apology strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Apology, Intentions, Experiment

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Verena UTIKAL, 2013. On the acceptance of apologies. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 82, pp. 592-608. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003
BibTex
@article{Fischbacher2013accep-26123,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003},
  title={On the acceptance of apologies},
  volume={82},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={592--608},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Utikal, Verena}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/26123">
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Games and Economic Behavior ; 82 (2013). - S. 592-608</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dc:contributor>Utikal, Verena</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Utikal, Verena</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>On the acceptance of apologies</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-01-30T10:16:31Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses an apology strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-01-30T10:16:31Z</dc:date>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/26123"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen