Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions
| dc.contributor.author | Friehe, Tim | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-02-02T15:09:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-02-02T15:09:22Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanctions for a crime may increase this crime's prevalence, using a principal-agent model with different crimes. The intuition is that the policy change may increase the principal's expected payoff from crime by decreasing the information rent required by the agent. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.identifier.ppn | 425688682 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29713 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper Series / Department of Economics | |
| dc.rights | terms-of-use | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Crime, principal-agent relation, information rent | eng |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | eng |
| dc.subject.jel | K42 | |
| dc.subject.jel | H23 | |
| dc.title | Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions | eng |
| dc.type | WORKINGPAPER | eng |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber | 2011-09 | eng |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @techreport{Friehe2011Tempt-29713,
year={2011},
series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
title={Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions},
number={2011-09},
author={Friehe, Tim}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FRIEHE, Tim, 2011. Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FRIEHE, Tim, 2011. Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions | eng |
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| temp.internal.duplicates | <p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 20.01.2015 11:39:39</p> | deu |
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