Publikation: Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions
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2011
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Zusammenfassung
This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanctions for a crime may increase this crime's prevalence, using a principal-agent model with different crimes. The intuition is that the policy change may increase the principal's expected payoff from crime by decreasing the information rent required by the agent.
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330 Wirtschaft
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Crime, principal-agent relation, information rent
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FRIEHE, Tim, 2011. Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing SanctionsBibTex
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year={2011},
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title={Tempting Righteous Citizens? : On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions},
number={2011-09},
author={Friehe, Tim}
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