Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information
| dc.contributor.author | Friehe, Tim | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-23T09:36:14Z | deu |
| dc.date.available | 2011-03-23T09:36:14Z | deu |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | deu |
| dc.description.abstract | The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals' perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Publ. in: Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance / M. Pickhardt, E. Shinnick (Eds.). Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78 | deu |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1871 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | deu |
| dc.legacy.dateIssued | 2009 | deu |
| dc.rights | terms-of-use | deu |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ | deu |
| dc.subject | Optimal law enforcement | deu |
| dc.subject | Escalating sanctions | deu |
| dc.subject | Repeat offender | deu |
| dc.subject | Imperfect information | deu |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | deu |
| dc.subject.jel | H23 - Exte | deu |
| dc.subject.jel | K42 - Ille | deu |
| dc.title | Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information | eng |
| dc.type | INCOLLECTION | deu |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @incollection{Friehe2008Repea-1871,
year={2008},
title={Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information},
publisher={Elsevier},
address={Cheltenham},
booktitle={Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance},
pages={63--78},
editor={Pickhardt, M. and Shinnick, E.},
author={Friehe, Tim}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FRIEHE, Tim, 2008. Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information. In: PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FRIEHE, Tim, 2008. Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information. In: PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78 | eng |
| kops.citation.rdf | <rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/1871">
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/52"/>
<dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator>
<dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1871"/>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/52"/>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:14Z</dcterms:available>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:14Z</dc:date>
<dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance / M. Pickhardt, E. Shinnick (Eds.). Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
<dcterms:title>Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information</dcterms:title>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals' perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.</dcterms:abstract>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF> | |
| kops.flag.knbibliography | true | |
| kops.identifier.nbn | urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-95375 | deu |
| kops.opus.id | 9537 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield | PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. <i>Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance</i>. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78 | eng |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 6c13a9c4-3893-47fd-bb11-1f149e927894 | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 6c13a9c4-3893-47fd-bb11-1f149e927894 | |
| source.bibliographicInfo.fromPage | 63 | |
| source.bibliographicInfo.toPage | 78 | |
| source.contributor.editor | Pickhardt, M. | |
| source.contributor.editor | Shinnick, E. | |
| source.publisher | Elsevier | |
| source.publisher.location | Cheltenham | |
| source.title | Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance |