Publikation: Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information
Lade...
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2008
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Beitrag zu einem Sammelband
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78
Zusammenfassung
The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals' perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Optimal law enforcement, Escalating sanctions, Repeat offender, Imperfect information
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690
FRIEHE, Tim, 2008. Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information. In: PICKHARDT, M., ed., E. SHINNICK, ed.. Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance. Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78BibTex
@incollection{Friehe2008Repea-1871,
year={2008},
title={Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information},
publisher={Elsevier},
address={Cheltenham},
booktitle={Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance},
pages={63--78},
editor={Pickhardt, M. and Shinnick, E.},
author={Friehe, Tim}
}RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/1871">
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/52"/>
<dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator>
<dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1871"/>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/52"/>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:14Z</dcterms:available>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:14Z</dc:date>
<dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance / M. Pickhardt, E. Shinnick (Eds.). Cheltenham: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 63-78</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
<dcterms:title>Repeat Offenders and Imperfect Information</dcterms:title>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals' perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.</dcterms:abstract>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
