Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?

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dc.contributor.authorEisenkopf, Gerald
dc.contributor.authorFischbacher, Urs
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:40:20Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:40:20Zdeu
dc.date.issued2011deu
dc.description.abstractMachiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that the trustee s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who actually decides gets a higher reward. Delegation only pays off for the initial decision maker if the value of the delegate s transfer is much higher than the value of the investor s transfer.eng
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dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.titleDoing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?eng
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  year={2011},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?},
  number={63},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2011. Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?deu
kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2011. Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?eng
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