Publikation: Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?
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2011
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Zusammenfassung
Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that the trustee s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who actually decides gets a higher reward. Delegation only pays off for the initial decision maker if the value of the delegate s transfer is much higher than the value of the investor s transfer.
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330 Wirtschaft
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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2011. Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?BibTex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2011Doing-11798,
year={2011},
series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
title={Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?},
number={63},
author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Fischbacher, Urs}
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<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that the trustee s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who actually decides gets a higher reward. Delegation only pays off for the initial decision maker if the value of the delegate s transfer is much higher than the value of the investor s transfer.</dcterms:abstract>
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