On the Uniqueness of Human Normative Attitudes

dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Marco F. H.
dc.contributor.authorRakoczy, Hannes
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-19T16:15:48Z
dc.date.available2022-01-19T16:15:48Z
dc.date.issued2019eng
dc.description.abstractHumans are normative beings through and through. This capacity for normativity lies at the core of uniquely human forms of understanding and regulating socio-cultural group life. Plausibly, therefore, the hominin lineage evolved specialized social-cognitive, motivational, and affective abilities that helped create, transmit, preserve, and amend shared social practices. In turn, these shared normative attitudes and practices shaped subsequent human phylogeny, constituted new forms of group life, and hence structured human ontogeny, too. An essential aspect of human ontogeny is therefore its reciprocal nature regarding normativity. This chapter reviews recent evidence from developmental psychology suggesting that, from early on, human children take a normative attitude toward others’ conduct in social interactions, and thus a collectivistic and impersonal perspective on norms. The chapter discusses to what extent humans’ closest living primate relatives lack normative attitudes and therefore live in a non-normative socio-causal world structured by individual preferences, power relationships, and regularities.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/56238
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.rightsterms-of-use
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dc.subjectsocial-cognitive development, social norms, normativity, child development, developmental psychology, moral development, morality, comparative psychology, primateseng
dc.subject.ddc150eng
dc.titleOn the Uniqueness of Human Normative Attitudeseng
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  year={2019},
  doi={10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006},
  title={On the Uniqueness of Human Normative Attitudes},
  isbn={978-0-19-084646-6},
  publisher={Oxford University Press},
  address={New York, NY},
  booktitle={The Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms},
  pages={121--136},
  editor={Roughley, Neil and Bayertz, Kurt},
  author={Schmidt, Marco F. H. and Rakoczy, Hannes}
}
kops.citation.iso690SCHMIDT, Marco F. H., Hannes RAKOCZY, 2019. On the Uniqueness of Human Normative Attitudes. In: ROUGHLEY, Neil, ed., Kurt BAYERTZ, ed.. The Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 121-136. ISBN 978-0-19-084646-6. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006deu
kops.citation.iso690SCHMIDT, Marco F. H., Hannes RAKOCZY, 2019. On the Uniqueness of Human Normative Attitudes. In: ROUGHLEY, Neil, ed., Kurt BAYERTZ, ed.. The Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 121-136. ISBN 978-0-19-084646-6. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006eng
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kops.sourcefieldROUGHLEY, Neil, ed., Kurt BAYERTZ, ed.. <i>The Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms</i>. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 121-136. ISBN 978-0-19-084646-6. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006deu
kops.sourcefield.plainROUGHLEY, Neil, ed., Kurt BAYERTZ, ed.. The Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 121-136. ISBN 978-0-19-084646-6. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006deu
kops.sourcefield.plainROUGHLEY, Neil, ed., Kurt BAYERTZ, ed.. The Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 121-136. ISBN 978-0-19-084646-6. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0006eng
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source.contributor.editorRoughley, Neil
source.contributor.editorBayertz, Kurt
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source.publisher.locationNew York, NYeng
source.titleThe Normative Animal? : On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Normseng

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