Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment

Bauernschuster, Stefan; Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Vadovic, Radovan

Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment

Dateien

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Datum

2010

Autor:innen

Bauernschuster, Stefan

Dürsch, Peter

Oechssler, Jörg

Vadovic, Radovan

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Journal of Public Economics. 2010, 94(11-12), pp. 870-877. ISSN 0047-2727. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.009

Zusammenfassung

The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention with student subjects in an experimental laboratory setting rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions. Both wages and replacement rates offered by competing employers are reciprocated by workers. However, replacement rates are only reciprocated as long as no minimum level is mandated. Although we observe adverse selection when workers have different exogenous probabilities for being absent from work, this does not lead to a market breakdown. In our experiment, mandating replacement rates actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of replacement rates by employers.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Sick pay, Sick leave, Experiment, Gift exchange

Zitieren

ISO 690

BAUERNSCHUSTER, Stefan, Peter DÜRSCH, Jörg OECHSSLER, Radovan VADOVIC, 2010. Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2010, 94(11-12), pp. 870-877. ISSN 0047-2727. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.009

BibTex

@article{Bauernschuster2010Manda-23211,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.009},
  title={Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment},
  number={11-12},
  volume={94},
  issn={0047-2727},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
  pages={870--877},
  author={Bauernschuster, Stefan and Dürsch, Peter and Oechssler, Jörg and Vadovic, Radovan}
}

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