(When) do electoral mandates set the agenda? : Government capacity and mandate responsiveness in Germany
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In democracies, electoral mandates are meant to shape public policy. But how much leeway do elected representatives actually have to implement it? Influential scholars think that (horizontal and vertical) institutional hurdles, budget constraints and political pressure dilute mandate responsiveness, but empirical evidence for this important claim remains scarce. This article provides a theoretical model and an empirical account of the extent to which different types of constraints limit the capacity of governing parties to set their electoral priorities on the agenda. Using fixed-effects Poisson regression on German electoral and legislative priorities over a period of over three decades (1983–2016), we conclude that policies reflect electoral priorities to a greater extent than scholarship has acknowledged so far. We do confirm, however, the constraining effects of Europeanization, shrinking budget leeway, intra-coalition disagreement and low executive popularity. We elaborate on the implications for theories of public policy, democratic representation and comparative politics.
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GUINAUDEAU, Benjamin, Isabelle GUINAUDEAU, 2023. (When) do electoral mandates set the agenda? : Government capacity and mandate responsiveness in Germany. In: European Journal of Political Research. Wiley. 2023, 62(4), pp. 1212-1234. ISSN 0304-4130. eISSN 1475-6765. Available under: doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12557BibTex
@article{Guinaudeau2023elect-59106, year={2023}, doi={10.1111/1475-6765.12557}, title={(When) do electoral mandates set the agenda? : Government capacity and mandate responsiveness in Germany}, number={4}, volume={62}, issn={0304-4130}, journal={European Journal of Political Research}, pages={1212--1234}, author={Guinaudeau, Benjamin and Guinaudeau, Isabelle} }
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