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Administrative delegation revisited : Experimental evidence on the behavioural consequences of public service motivation and risk aversion

Administrative delegation revisited : Experimental evidence on the behavioural consequences of public service motivation and risk aversion

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TEPE, Markus, Susumu SHIKANO, Michael JANKOWSKI, Maximilian LUTZ, 2022. Administrative delegation revisited : Experimental evidence on the behavioural consequences of public service motivation and risk aversion. In: International Review of Administrative Sciences. Sage. 9(4). ISSN 0020-8523. eISSN 1461-7226. Available under: doi: 10.1177/00208523211073259

@article{Tepe2022-09Admin-56923, title={Administrative delegation revisited : Experimental evidence on the behavioural consequences of public service motivation and risk aversion}, year={2022}, doi={10.1177/00208523211073259}, number={4}, volume={9}, issn={0020-8523}, journal={International Review of Administrative Sciences}, author={Tepe, Markus and Shikano, Susumu and Jankowski, Michael and Lutz, Maximilian} }

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