Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory
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One main goal of argumentation theory is to evaluate arguments and to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected. When there is no clear answer, a third option, being undecided, has to be taken into account. Indecision is often not considered explicitly, but rather taken to be a collection of all unclear or troubling cases. However, current philosophy makes a strong point for taking indecision itself to be a proper object of consideration. This paper aims at revealing parallels between the findings concerning indecision in philosophy and the treatment of indecision in argumentation theory. By investigating what philosophical forms and norms of indecision are involved in argumentation theory, we can improve our understanding of the different uncertain evidential situations in argumentation theory.
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SCHUSTER, Daniela, 2021. Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory. Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, 15th International Conference, DEON 2020/2021. München, 21. Juli 2021 - 24. Juli 2021. In: LIU, Fenrong, Hrsg., Alessandra MARRA, Hrsg., Paul PORTNER, Hrsg., Frederik VAN DE PUTTE, Hrsg.. Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, 15th International Conference, DEON 2020/2021. Rickmansworth: College Publications, 2021, S. 394-413. ISBN 978-1-84890-352-4BibTex
@inproceedings{Schuster2021Forms-56744, year={2021}, title={Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory}, url={http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/DEON/?00003}, isbn={978-1-84890-352-4}, publisher={College Publications}, address={Rickmansworth}, booktitle={Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, 15th International Conference, DEON 2020/2021}, pages={394--413}, editor={Liu, Fenrong and Marra, Alessandra and Portner, Paul and Van De Putte, Frederik}, author={Schuster, Daniela} }
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