KOPS - The Institutional Repository of the University of Konstanz

Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

Cite This

Files in this item

Checksum: MD5:5fb6519379e7ab1832de0c7ddc83bc5e

BEISER-MCGRATH, Janina, Nils W. METTERNICH, 2021. Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes. In: Comparative Political Studies. Sage. 54(1), pp. 144-178. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414020920656

@article{BeiserMcGrath2021-01Ethni-50399, title={Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes}, year={2021}, doi={10.1177/0010414020920656}, number={1}, volume={54}, issn={0010-4140}, journal={Comparative Political Studies}, pages={144--178}, author={Beiser-McGrath, Janina and Metternich, Nils W.} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/50399"> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Why do authoritarian governments exclude ethnic groups if this jeopardizes their regime survival? We generalize existing arguments that attribute exclusion dynamics to ethnic coalition formation. We argue that a mutual commitment problem, between the ethnic ruling group and potential coalition members, leads to power-balanced ethnic coalitions. However, authoritarian regimes with institutions that mitigate credible commitment problems facilitate the formation of coalitions that are less balanced in power. We test our arguments with a k-adic conditional logit approach, using data on ethnic groups and their power status. We demonstrate that in autocracies, the ruling ethnic group is more likely to form and maintain coalitions that balance population sizes among all coalition members. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the extent to which balancing occurs is conditional on authoritarian regime type.</dcterms:abstract> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/50399/1/Beiser-McGrath_2-1lpa7nraaricp7.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Metternich, Nils W.</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Beiser-McGrath, Janina</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:title>Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes</dcterms:title> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/50399/1/Beiser-McGrath_2-1lpa7nraaricp7.pdf"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-07-30T09:48:18Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>Attribution 4.0 International</dc:rights> <dcterms:issued>2021-01</dcterms:issued> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/50399"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:creator>Beiser-McGrath, Janina</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-07-30T09:48:18Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Metternich, Nils W.</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Downloads since Jul 30, 2020 (Information about access statistics)

Beiser-McGrath_2-1lpa7nraaricp7.pdf 67

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Attribution 4.0 International Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account