## Libertarianism and the Problem of Clear Cases

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2019
Journal article
Published
##### Published in
Grazer Philosophische Studien ; 96 (2019), 4. - pp. 518-540. - ISSN 0165-9227. - eISSN 1875-6735
##### Abstract
New varieties of libertarianism connect not only free will and moral responsibility to indeterminism, but also agency and choice as such. In this paper, the author highlights what seems to be an embarrassment for all libertarian accounts, but especially for the ones just mentioned. The problem is brought out by clear cases of decisions in which there are strong and rather obvious reasons for one of the options and only relatively weak ones in favour of the alternatives. It is hard to insist that there be indeterminism even in such cases. Either it has no significant role to play, which means that libertarianism is in effect largely abandoned, or it has a purely negative role, being linked to some serious and thoroughgoing defect in the agent’s rationality. Thus, a dilemma for libertarians arises, which the author spells out in the text. Furthermore, he argues that some versions of compatibilism face essentially the same difficulty.
100 Philosophy
##### Keywords
libertarianism; clear cases; choice; agency; free will; two-way powers
##### Cite This
ISO 690ROSENTHAL, Jacob, 2019. Libertarianism and the Problem of Clear Cases. In: Grazer Philosophische Studien. 96(4), pp. 518-540. ISSN 0165-9227. eISSN 1875-6735. Available under: doi: 10.1163/18756735-000069
BibTex
@article{Rosenthal2019-11-21Liber-48199,
year={2019},
doi={10.1163/18756735-000069},
title={Libertarianism and the Problem of Clear Cases},
number={4},
volume={96},
issn={0165-9227},
journal={Grazer Philosophische Studien},
pages={518--540},
author={Rosenthal, Jacob}
}

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Yes
Yes