Type of Publication:  Journal article 
Publication status:  Published 
Author:  Raidl, Eric 
Year of publication:  2019 
Published in:  Journal of Logic, Language and Information ; 28 (2019), 4.  pp. 515549.  ISSN 09258531.  eISSN 15729583 
DOI (citable link):  https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849019092890 
Summary: 
According to Stalnaker’s Thesis (S), the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability. Under some mild conditions, the thesis trivialises probabilities and conditionals, as initially shown by David Lewis. This article asks the following question: does (S) still lead to triviality, if the probability function in (S) is replaced by a probabilitylike function? The article considers plausibility functions, in the sense of Friedman and Halpern, which additionally mimic probabilistic additivity and conditionalisation. These quasi probabilities comprise Friedman–Halpern’s conditional plausibility spaces, as well as other known representations of conditional doxastic states. The paper proves Lewis’ triviality for quasi probabilities and discusses how this has implications for three other prominent strategies to avoid Lewis’ triviality: (1) Adams’ thesis, where the probability function on the left in (S) is replaced by a probabilitylike function, (2) abandoning conditionalisation, where probability conditionalisation on the right in (S) is replaced by another propositional update procedure and (3) the approximation thesis, where equality in (S) is replaced by approximation. The paper also shows that Lewis’ triviality result is really about ‘additiveness’ and ‘conditionality’.

Subject (DDC):  100 Philosophy 
Bibliography of Konstanz:  Yes 
Refereed:  Yes 
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RAIDL, Eric, 2019. Lewis' Triviality for Quasi Probabilities. In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information. 28(4), pp. 515549. ISSN 09258531. eISSN 15729583. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10849019092890
@article{Raidl201912Lewis47929, title={Lewis' Triviality for Quasi Probabilities}, year={2019}, doi={10.1007/s10849019092890}, number={4}, volume={28}, issn={09258531}, journal={Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, pages={515549}, author={Raidl, Eric} }
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