Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment
| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| Publication status: | Published |
| Author: | Findeisen, Sebastian; Sachs, Dominik |
| Year of publication: | 2018 |
| Published in: | The Scandinavian Journal of Economics ; 120 (2018), 4. - pp. 1075-1099. - ISSN 0347-0520. - eISSN 1467-9442 |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12246 |
| Summary: |
We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real‐world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.
|
| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Keywords: | Inequality, time inconsistency |
| Refereed: | Yes |
Cite This
Files in this item
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
|
There are no files associated with this item. |
|||
FINDEISEN, Sebastian, Dominik SACHS, 2018. Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment. In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 120(4), pp. 1075-1099. ISSN 0347-0520. eISSN 1467-9442. Available under: doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12246
@article{Findeisen2018-10-03Educa-47681, title={Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment}, year={2018}, doi={10.1111/sjoe.12246}, number={4}, volume={120}, issn={0347-0520}, journal={The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, pages={1075--1099}, author={Findeisen, Sebastian and Sachs, Dominik} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/47681"> <dc:contributor>Sachs, Dominik</dc:contributor> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real‐world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2019-11-28T08:46:51Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Findeisen, Sebastian</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2019-11-28T08:46:51Z</dc:date> <dcterms:issued>2018-10-03</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Sachs, Dominik</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/47681"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:creator>Findeisen, Sebastian</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
Search KOPS
Browse
My Account
