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Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain

Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain

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BECKS, Lutz, Manfred MILINSKI, 2019. Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain. In: Nature Communications. 10, 783. eISSN 2041-1723. Available under: doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7

@article{Becks2019-02-15Extor-45222, title={Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain}, year={2019}, doi={10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7}, volume={10}, journal={Nature Communications}, author={Becks, Lutz and Milinski, Manfred}, note={Article Number: 783} }

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