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Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : an experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems

Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : an experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems

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ANGELOVA, Vera, Lisa V. BRUTTEL, Werner GÜTH, Ulrich KAMECKE, 2013. Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : an experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems. In: Economic Inquiry. 51(2), pp. 1345-1356. ISSN 0095-2583. eISSN 1465-7295. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00421.x

@article{Angelova2013-04subga-42469, title={Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : an experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems}, year={2013}, doi={10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00421.x}, number={2}, volume={51}, issn={0095-2583}, journal={Economic Inquiry}, pages={1345--1356}, author={Angelova, Vera and Bruttel, Lisa V. and Güth, Werner and Kamecke, Ulrich} }

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