Accountability and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials

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HESSAMI, Zohal, 2018. Accountability and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics. 100(1), pp. 51-64. ISSN 0034-6535. eISSN 1530-9142. Available under: doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00684

@article{Hessami2018-03Accou-41882, title={Accountability and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials}, year={2018}, doi={10.1162/REST_a_00684}, number={1}, volume={100}, issn={0034-6535}, journal={The Review of Economics and Statistics}, pages={51--64}, author={Hessami, Zohal} }

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