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Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government

Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government

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LEUFFEN, Dirk, 2009. Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government. In: West European Politics. 32(6), pp. 1140-1160. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Available under: doi: 10.1080/01402380903230603

@article{Leuffen2009Cohab-37639, title={Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government}, year={2009}, doi={10.1080/01402380903230603}, number={6}, volume={32}, issn={0140-2382}, journal={West European Politics}, pages={1140--1160}, author={Leuffen, Dirk} }

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