Uninformed Individuals Promote Democratic Consensus in Animal Groups
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
EU-Projektnummer
DFG-Projektnummer
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Sammlungen
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Conflicting interests among group members are common when making collective decisions, yet failure to achieve consensus can be costly. Under these circumstances individuals may be susceptible to manipulation by a strongly opinionated, or extremist, minority. It has previously been argued, for humans and animals, that social groups containing individuals who are uninformed, or exhibit weak preferences, are particularly vulnerable to such manipulative agents. Here, we use theory and experiment to demonstrate that, for a wide range of conditions, a strongly opinionated minority can dictate group choice, but the presence of uninformed individuals spontaneously inhibits this process, returning control to the numerical majority. Our results emphasize the role of uninformed individuals in achieving democratic consensus amid internal group conflict and informational constraints.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
COUZIN, Iain D., Christos C. IOANNOU, Güven DEMIREL, Thilo GROSS, Colin J. TORNEY, Andrew HARTNETT, Larissa CONRADT, Simon A. LEVIN, Naomi E. LEONARD, 2011. Uninformed Individuals Promote Democratic Consensus in Animal Groups. In: Science. 2011, 334(6062), pp. 1578-1580. ISSN 0036-8075. eISSN 1095-9203. Available under: doi: 10.1126/science.1210280BibTex
@article{Couzin2011-12-16Uninf-37526, year={2011}, doi={10.1126/science.1210280}, title={Uninformed Individuals Promote Democratic Consensus in Animal Groups}, number={6062}, volume={334}, issn={0036-8075}, journal={Science}, pages={1578--1580}, author={Couzin, Iain D. and Ioannou, Christos C. and Demirel, Güven and Gross, Thilo and Torney, Colin J. and Hartnett, Andrew and Conradt, Larissa and Levin, Simon A. and Leonard, Naomi E.} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/37526"> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-02-16T14:38:57Z</dc:date> <dcterms:title>Uninformed Individuals Promote Democratic Consensus in Animal Groups</dcterms:title> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/37526"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/37526/1/Couzin_0-388247.pdf"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-02-16T14:38:57Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Demirel, Güven</dc:creator> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/37526/1/Couzin_0-388247.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Gross, Thilo</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Hartnett, Andrew</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Levin, Simon A.</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Leonard, Naomi E.</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Demirel, Güven</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Torney, Colin J.</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Conflicting interests among group members are common when making collective decisions, yet failure to achieve consensus can be costly. Under these circumstances individuals may be susceptible to manipulation by a strongly opinionated, or extremist, minority. It has previously been argued, for humans and animals, that social groups containing individuals who are uninformed, or exhibit weak preferences, are particularly vulnerable to such manipulative agents. Here, we use theory and experiment to demonstrate that, for a wide range of conditions, a strongly opinionated minority can dictate group choice, but the presence of uninformed individuals spontaneously inhibits this process, returning control to the numerical majority. Our results emphasize the role of uninformed individuals in achieving democratic consensus amid internal group conflict and informational constraints.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/28"/> <dc:contributor>Ioannou, Christos C.</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Couzin, Iain D.</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Levin, Simon A.</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Leonard, Naomi E.</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Hartnett, Andrew</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Conradt, Larissa</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dc:creator>Gross, Thilo</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2011-12-16</dcterms:issued> <dc:contributor>Torney, Colin J.</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Couzin, Iain D.</dc:contributor> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Ioannou, Christos C.</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Conradt, Larissa</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/28"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>