Type of Publication: | Journal article |
Publication status: | Published |
URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-369490 |
Author: | Zuber, Christina Isabel |
Year of publication: | 2011 |
Published in: | Comparative Political Studies ; 44 (2011), 5. - pp. 546-571. - ISSN 0010-4140. - eISSN 1552-3829 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414010364350 |
Summary: |
This article presents a baseline theory of asymmetrical federalism in multinational states. Two arguments building on a game-theoretic foundation link central and regional elites’ strategic choices to questions of federal stability. The first argument concerns the creation of asymmetrical institutions. In a confrontation game between the center and national minorities credibly threatening to exit the framework, the center’s decision to grant asymmetrical autonomy ensures mutual cooperation. Yet by extending the level of autonomy for minority regions, federal asymmetry creates a third player, the nonadvantaged regions. Consequently, the second argument models asymmetrical federalism as a “nested game” where events in the ethnonational arena determine the payoffs in the federal arena. Asymmetrical federal rules turn out to be inherently unstable from a perspective that takes all actors in all arenas into account. A narrative of the development of Russian federalism exemplifies the theory.
|
Subject (DDC): | 320 Politics |
Keywords: | asymmetrical federalism, federal stability secession, multinational states, Russian federalism, nested games |
Link to License: | In Copyright |
xmlui.ArtifactBrowser.ItemViewer.detail.textAllianzLicense | |
ZUBER, Christina Isabel, 2011. Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism. In: Comparative Political Studies. 44(5), pp. 546-571. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414010364350
@article{Zuber2011-05-01Under-36208, title={Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism}, year={2011}, doi={10.1177/0010414010364350}, number={5}, volume={44}, issn={0010-4140}, journal={Comparative Political Studies}, pages={546--571}, author={Zuber, Christina Isabel} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/36208"> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/36208"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/36208/1/Zuber_0-369490.pdf"/> <dc:creator>Zuber, Christina Isabel</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2011-05-01</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:title>Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism</dcterms:title> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-12-07T14:14:43Z</dc:date> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This article presents a baseline theory of asymmetrical federalism in multinational states. Two arguments building on a game-theoretic foundation link central and regional elites’ strategic choices to questions of federal stability. The first argument concerns the creation of asymmetrical institutions. In a confrontation game between the center and national minorities credibly threatening to exit the framework, the center’s decision to grant asymmetrical autonomy ensures mutual cooperation. Yet by extending the level of autonomy for minority regions, federal asymmetry creates a third player, the nonadvantaged regions. Consequently, the second argument models asymmetrical federalism as a “nested game” where events in the ethnonational arena determine the payoffs in the federal arena. Asymmetrical federal rules turn out to be inherently unstable from a perspective that takes all actors in all arenas into account. A narrative of the development of Russian federalism exemplifies the theory.</dcterms:abstract> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-12-07T14:14:43Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/36208/1/Zuber_0-369490.pdf"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Zuber, Christina Isabel</dc:contributor> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Zuber_0-369490.pdf | 279 |