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Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism

Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism

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ZUBER, Christina Isabel, 2011. Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism. In: Comparative Political Studies. 44(5), pp. 546-571. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414010364350

@article{Zuber2011-05-01Under-36208, title={Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism}, year={2011}, doi={10.1177/0010414010364350}, number={5}, volume={44}, issn={0010-4140}, journal={Comparative Political Studies}, pages={546--571}, author={Zuber, Christina Isabel} }

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