On the analogy of free will and free belief

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WAGNER, Verena, 2017. On the analogy of free will and free belief. In: Synthese. 194(8), pp. 2785-2810. ISSN 0039-7857. eISSN 1573-0964. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0851-9

@article{Wagner2017-08analo-33411, title={On the analogy of free will and free belief}, year={2017}, doi={10.1007/s11229-015-0851-9}, number={8}, volume={194}, issn={0039-7857}, journal={Synthese}, pages={2785--2810}, author={Wagner, Verena} }

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