Voting on Social Security : The Family as Decision-Making Unit
| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| Publication status: | Published |
| Author: | Breyer, Friedrich; Von der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias |
| Year of publication: | 1987 |
| Published in: | Kyklos ; 40 (1987), 4. - pp. 529-547. - ISSN 0023-5962. - eISSN 1467-6435 |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00788.x |
| Summary: |
In periods of demographic change, pay-as-you-go financed social security systems imply transfers of lifetime income not only among generational cohorts, but also between families of different size and generational composition. Whereas previous models of voting on social security in democratic societies focused on the first type of transfer and assumed homogeneity of interests within each generation, we treat the family as the relevant decision-making unit. It is then analyzed how the results of majority voting on public pension and sickness funds depend on the rate of time preference, the overall rate of population growth and the distribution of children across families. Not surprisingly, opposition to mandatory social security turns out to be greatest when children are most unevenly distributed.
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| Summary in another language: |
In Zeiten demographischen Wandels ist mit einem umlagefinanzierten Sozialversicherungssystem eine Umverteilung von Lebenseinkommen nicht nur zwischen verschiedenen Generationen verbunden, sondern auch zwischen Familien unterschiedlicher Grösse und Zusammensetzung. In früheren Modellen der Abstimmung über obligatorische Sozialversicherung in demokratischen Gesellschaften wurde nur der erste Typ von Transfers betrachtet und Homogenität der Interessen innerhalb jeder Generation angenommen. Dagegen behandeln wir die Familie als die relevante Entscheidungseinheit und untersuchen dann, wie das Ergebnis einer Abstimmung über gesetzliche Alters- und Krankenversicherung von der Zeitpräferenzrate, der Wachstumsrate der Bevölkerung und der Verteilung der Kinder auf die Familien abhängt. Erwartungsgemäss ist die Opposition gegen obligatorische Sozialversicherung dann am stärksten, wenn die Kinderzahl besonders ungleich verteilt ist.
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| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
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BREYER, Friedrich, J.-Matthias VON DER SCHULENBURG, 1987. Voting on Social Security : The Family as Decision-Making Unit. In: Kyklos. 40(4), pp. 529-547. ISSN 0023-5962. eISSN 1467-6435. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00788.x
@article{Breyer1987-11Votin-33402, title={Voting on Social Security : The Family as Decision-Making Unit}, year={1987}, doi={10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00788.x}, number={4}, volume={40}, issn={0023-5962}, journal={Kyklos}, pages={529--547}, author={Breyer, Friedrich and Von der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias} }
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