The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power


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GENG, Hong, Arne Robert WEISS, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2011. The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory. 13(5), pp. 695-719. ISSN 1097-3923. eISSN 1467-9779. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01517.x

@article{Geng2011Limit-32930, title={The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power}, year={2011}, doi={10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01517.x}, number={5}, volume={13}, issn={1097-3923}, journal={Journal of Public Economic Theory}, pages={695--719}, author={Geng, Hong and Weiss, Arne Robert and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2016-02-10T10:20:15Z</dcterms:available> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:contributor>Geng, Hong</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2016-02-10T10:20:15Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Geng, Hong</dc:creator> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:creator>Weiss, Arne Robert</dc:creator> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In this paper, we experimentally approach the question of which aspects of a voting procedure are able to restrict elected candidates’ willingness to use their power in an opportunistic way. For this purpose, we rule out re-election concerns and analyze whether the presence of a vote by itself matters for the exercise of power. We compare two kinds of electoral campaigns: self-descriptions of personality and promises regarding prospective in-office behavior. We find that social approval as conveyed by a vote does not suffice to induce pro-social choices by elected candidates. On the other hand, when campaigns are promise-based, elected candidates transfer more to their recipients than candidates selected by a random draw even though promises do not differ. This refutes explanations based on a taste for consistency or costs of lying. In contrast, the fact that the correlation between dictators’ promises and their beliefs on voter expectations is considerably strengthened in the presence of a vote offers support to a guilt-aversion hypothesis. However, this support is qualified by the correlation between dictators’ second-order beliefs and their choices, which is weaker than predicted. Overall, our results suggest the power of voting to limit the self-oriented exertion of power is limited and context specific.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:title>The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Weiss, Arne Robert</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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