Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model
| Type of Publication: | Working Paper/Technical Report |
| Publication status: | Published |
| URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-319713 |
| Author: | Breitwieser, Maria |
| Year of publication: | 2015 |
| Series: | Working Paper Series / Department of Economics ; 2015-16 |
| Summary: |
The presented paper offers a simple search model of the labor market to explain the empirical findings on the role of reciprocity for labor market outcomes as reported by Dohmen et al. (2009). In an agency setting where profit-maximizing firms compete for heterogeneous reciprocal workers, with full information about workers’ types, reciprocal workers who are willing to engage in gift exchange are approached by more firms, get higher wages and exert higher efforts than selfish workers.
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| JEL Classification: | D03; D21; E24; J31; J64 |
| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, gift exchange, competitive search equilibrium, optimal contracts, wage differentials, unemployment |
| Link to License: | Terms of use |
| Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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BREITWIESER, Maria, 2015. Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model
@techreport{Breitwieser2015Optim-32778, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model}, year={2015}, number={2015-16}, author={Breitwieser, Maria} }
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