Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model

Publikationstyp: Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus: Published
URI (zitierfähiger Link): http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-319713
Autor/innen: Breitwieser, Maria
Erscheinungsjahr: 2015
Schriftenreihe: Working Paper Series / Department of Economics ; 2015-16
Zusammenfassung:
The presented paper offers a simple search model of the labor market to explain the empirical findings on the role of reciprocity for labor market outcomes as reported by Dohmen et al. (2009). In an agency setting where profit-maximizing firms compete for heterogeneous reciprocal workers, with full information about workers’ types, reciprocal workers who are willing to engage in gift exchange are approached by more firms, get higher wages and exert higher efforts than selfish workers.
JEL-Klassifikation: D03; D21; E24; J31; J64
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter: reciprocity, gift exchange, competitive search equilibrium, optimal contracts, wage differentials, unemployment
Link zur Lizenz: Deposit-Lizenz
Universitätsbibliographie: Ja

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BREITWIESER, Maria, 2015. Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model

@techreport{Breitwieser2015Optim-32778, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model}, year={2015}, number={2015-16}, author={Breitwieser, Maria} }

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