The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover

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SCHOLL, Almuth, 2015. The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover

@techreport{Scholl2015Dynam-32695, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover}, year={2015}, number={2015-05}, author={Scholl, Almuth} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 25.01.2016 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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