A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality

Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus: Published
Autor/innen: Fink, Fabian; Scholl, Almuth
Erscheinungsjahr: 2016
Erschienen in: Journal of International Economics ; 98 (2016). - S. 176-190. - ISSN 0022-1996. - eISSN 1873-0353
DOI (zitierfähiger Link): https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007
Zusammenfassung:
In times of sovereign debt crises, International Financial Institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies. This paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs. Conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy. In the model, the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation. Quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short-run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long-run. Increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump-shaped pattern of sovereign default risk.
JEL-Klassifikation: E44, E62, F34
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter: Sovereign debt, bailouts, quantitative model
Universitätsbibliographie: Ja

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FINK, Fabian, Almuth SCHOLL, 2016. A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality. In: Journal of International Economics. 98, pp. 176-190. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007

@article{Fink2016quant-32693, title={A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality}, year={2016}, doi={10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.007}, volume={98}, issn={0022-1996}, journal={Journal of International Economics}, pages={176--190}, author={Fink, Fabian and Scholl, Almuth} }

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