Committee design with endogenous participation

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HAHN, Volker, 2017. Committee design with endogenous participation. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 102, pp. 388-408. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473

@article{Hahn2017Commi-24655, title={Committee design with endogenous participation}, year={2017}, doi={10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009}, volume={102}, issn={0899-8256}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, pages={388--408}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/24655"> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-05-24T09:13:37Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Committee design with endogenous participation</dcterms:title> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/24655"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-05-24T09:13:37Z</dc:date> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Fourth, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:issued>2017</dcterms:issued> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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