Committee design with endogenous participation

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HAHN, Volker, 2017. Committee design with endogenous participation. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 102, pp. 388-408. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009

@article{Hahn2017Commi-24655, title={Committee design with endogenous participation}, year={2017}, doi={10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009}, volume={102}, issn={0899-8256}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, pages={388--408}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

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