A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits

dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszlodeu
dc.contributor.authorPannenberg, Markusdeu
dc.contributor.authorUrsprung, Heinrich
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-20T11:02:06Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-10-31T23:25:04Zdeu
dc.date.issued2010deu
dc.description.abstractIn a wage bargaining model, a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages. Therefore, the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility, raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process. We consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support. Our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right-wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential. Using panel data for 19 OECD countries, we find support for these theoretical predictions. Moreover, we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.citationFirst publ. in: Public Choice 145 (2010), 1-2, pp. 137-163deu
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0
dc.identifier.ppn344778541deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/12696
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2011-05-20deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectEarnings relationshipdeu
dc.subjectpanel datadeu
dc.subjectpolitical support maximizationdeu
dc.subjectwage bargainingdeu
dc.subjectunemployment benefitsdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.titleA positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefitseng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Goerke2010posit-12696,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0},
  title={A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits},
  number={1-2},
  volume={145},
  journal={Public Choice},
  pages={137--163},
  author={Goerke, Laszlo and Pannenberg, Markus and Ursprung, Heinrich}
}
kops.citation.iso690GOERKE, Laszlo, Markus PANNENBERG, Heinrich URSPRUNG, 2010. A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits. In: Public Choice. 2010, 145(1-2), pp. 137-163. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0deu
kops.citation.iso690GOERKE, Laszlo, Markus PANNENBERG, Heinrich URSPRUNG, 2010. A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits. In: Public Choice. 2010, 145(1-2), pp. 137-163. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0eng
kops.citation.rdf
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/12696">
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-05-20T11:02:06Z</dc:date>
    <dc:contributor>Ursprung, Heinrich</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Ursprung, Heinrich</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12696/1/Ursprungetal.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-10-31T23:25:04Z</dcterms:available>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/12696"/>
    <dc:contributor>Pannenberg, Markus</dc:contributor>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:contributor>Goerke, Laszlo</dc:contributor>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12696/1/Ursprungetal.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In a wage bargaining model, a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages. Therefore, the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility, raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process. We consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support. Our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right-wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential. Using panel data for 19 OECD countries, we find support for these theoretical predictions. Moreover, we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Public Choice 145 (2010), 1-2, pp. 137-163</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:creator>Pannenberg, Markus</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:creator>Goerke, Laszlo</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits</dcterms:title>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
kops.description.openAccessopenaccessgreen
kops.flag.knbibliographytrue
kops.identifier.nbnurn:nbn:de:bsz:352-126969deu
kops.sourcefieldPublic Choice. 2010, <b>145</b>(1-2), pp. 137-163. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0deu
kops.sourcefield.plainPublic Choice. 2010, 145(1-2), pp. 137-163. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0deu
kops.sourcefield.plainPublic Choice. 2010, 145(1-2), pp. 137-163. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0eng
kops.submitter.emailoleg.kozlov@uni-konstanz.dedeu
relation.isAuthorOfPublication1715f856-e58e-46f7-99fb-7c1b800b25e8
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery1715f856-e58e-46f7-99fb-7c1b800b25e8
source.bibliographicInfo.fromPage137
source.bibliographicInfo.issue1-2
source.bibliographicInfo.toPage163
source.bibliographicInfo.volume145
source.periodicalTitlePublic Choice

Dateien

Originalbündel

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 1 von 1
Vorschaubild nicht verfügbar
Name:
Ursprungetal.pdf
Größe:
1 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Ursprungetal.pdf
Ursprungetal.pdfGröße: 1 MBDownloads: 383

Lizenzbündel

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 1 von 1
Vorschaubild nicht verfügbar
Name:
license.txt
Größe:
1.92 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Beschreibung:
license.txt
license.txtGröße: 1.92 KBDownloads: 0