Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

dc.contributor.authorHerrmann, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-11T08:20:40Z
dc.date.available2015-02-11T08:20:40Z
dc.date.issued2014eng
dc.description.abstractHow do polls influence strategic voting under proportional representation? This paper derives a strategic calculus of voting for coalitions that generates testable predictions about the effects of polls on strategic voting in elections involving four or more parties. Incentives of leftist voters to vote for a centrist over a noncentrist party are shown to increase with the difference in expected seats between the prospective right-wing and left-wing coalitions (and vice versa for rightist voters). Centrist voters’ incentives to vote for a center-left vs a center-right party are also shown to depend on the relative strengths of the right-wing and left-wing coalitions. Importantly, the strategic voting incentives studied here do not depend on the presence of electoral thresholds or other features of the electoral system. The predictions are tested with survey data from parliamentary elections in Austria and Germany.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0951629813505722eng
dc.identifier.ppn426134915
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29819
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.rightsterms-of-use
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectCoalitional voting, pivot probability, polls, proportional representation, strategic votingeng
dc.subject.ddc320eng
dc.titlePolls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representationeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Herrmann2014Polls-29819,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.1177/0951629813505722},
  title={Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation},
  number={3},
  volume={26},
  issn={0951-6298},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={442--467},
  author={Herrmann, Michael}
}
kops.citation.iso690HERRMANN, Michael, 2014. Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2014, 26(3), pp. 442-467. ISSN 0951-6298. eISSN 1460-3667. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0951629813505722deu
kops.citation.iso690HERRMANN, Michael, 2014. Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2014, 26(3), pp. 442-467. ISSN 0951-6298. eISSN 1460-3667. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0951629813505722eng
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kops.sourcefieldJournal of Theoretical Politics. 2014, <b>26</b>(3), pp. 442-467. ISSN 0951-6298. eISSN 1460-3667. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0951629813505722deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Theoretical Politics. 2014, 26(3), pp. 442-467. ISSN 0951-6298. eISSN 1460-3667. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0951629813505722deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Theoretical Politics. 2014, 26(3), pp. 442-467. ISSN 0951-6298. eISSN 1460-3667. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0951629813505722eng
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source.periodicalTitleJournal of Theoretical Politicseng
temp.internal.duplicates<p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 19.11.2014 14:58:09</p>deu

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