Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?
| dc.contributor.author | Brendler, Viktoria | |
| dc.contributor.author | Thomann, Eva | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-10T12:21:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-02-10T12:21:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This article analyses the role of institutional misfit in why member states customise European Union (EU) renewable energy (RE) policies when implementing them. Institutional misfit theory posits that member states only adjust to EU policies when the adaptation pressure remains moderate and national actors’ policy preferences align. Conversely, this article tests the argument that member states manage institutional misfit by adjusting – customising – EU policies, that is, through vertical EU policy change rather than domestic change. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the article compares the customisation of EU Directive 2009/28/EC in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, results suggest that institutional misfit is not a necessary condition for customised implementation. Instead, when high institutional fit meets high salience, member states may issue substantively more ambitious policies than the EU requires. Conversely, when high institutional fit meets low salience, member states have no impetus to customise EU rules. | |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734 | |
| dc.identifier.ppn | 1895784727 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/66045 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.subject | European energy policy | |
| dc.subject | Europeanisation | |
| dc.subject | customisation | |
| dc.subject | implementation | |
| dc.subject | institutional misfit | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 320 | |
| dc.title | Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance? | eng |
| dc.type | JOURNAL_ARTICLE | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @article{Brendler2024insti-66045,
year={2024},
doi={10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734},
title={Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?},
number={3},
volume={47},
issn={0140-2382},
journal={West European Politics},
pages={515--542},
author={Brendler, Viktoria and Thomann, Eva}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | BRENDLER, Viktoria, Eva THOMANN, 2024. Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?. In: West European Politics. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2024, 47(3), S. 515-542. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | BRENDLER, Viktoria, Eva THOMANN, 2024. Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?. In: West European Politics. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2024, 47(3), pp. 515-542. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Available under: doi: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734 | eng |
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