Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?

dc.contributor.authorBrendler, Viktoria
dc.contributor.authorThomann, Eva
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-10T12:21:18Z
dc.date.available2023-02-10T12:21:18Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThis article analyses the role of institutional misfit in why member states customise European Union (EU) renewable energy (RE) policies when implementing them. Institutional misfit theory posits that member states only adjust to EU policies when the adaptation pressure remains moderate and national actors’ policy preferences align. Conversely, this article tests the argument that member states manage institutional misfit by adjusting – customising – EU policies, that is, through vertical EU policy change rather than domestic change. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the article compares the customisation of EU Directive 2009/28/EC in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, results suggest that institutional misfit is not a necessary condition for customised implementation. Instead, when high institutional fit meets high salience, member states may issue substantively more ambitious policies than the EU requires. Conversely, when high institutional fit meets low salience, member states have no impetus to customise EU rules.
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734
dc.identifier.ppn1895784727
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/66045
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectEuropean energy policy
dc.subjectEuropeanisation
dc.subjectcustomisation
dc.subjectimplementation
dc.subjectinstitutional misfit
dc.subject.ddc320
dc.titleDoes institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?eng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLE
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Brendler2024insti-66045,
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  doi={10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734},
  title={Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?},
  number={3},
  volume={47},
  issn={0140-2382},
  journal={West European Politics},
  pages={515--542},
  author={Brendler, Viktoria and Thomann, Eva}
}
kops.citation.iso690BRENDLER, Viktoria, Eva THOMANN, 2024. Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?. In: West European Politics. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2024, 47(3), S. 515-542. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734deu
kops.citation.iso690BRENDLER, Viktoria, Eva THOMANN, 2024. Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?. In: West European Politics. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2024, 47(3), pp. 515-542. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Available under: doi: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734eng
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