Publikation:

Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Reuter_0-274268.pdf
Reuter_0-274268.pdfGröße: 368.89 KBDownloads: 92

Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Auflagebezeichnung

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Zusammenfassung

It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both imply desistance of the violation. The trial option might induce these parties to be less willing to contribute evidence to public cases. Private trials crowd out public prosecution and can have ambiguous effects on the number of enforcement errors.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

private and public enforcement, damages, antitrust litigation

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690REUTER, Tim, 2012. Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority
BibTex
@techreport{Reuter2012Priva-30414,
  year={2012},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority},
  number={2012-04},
  author={Reuter, Tim}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/30414">
    <dcterms:title>Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority</dcterms:title>
    <dc:creator>Reuter, Tim</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30414"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-19T09:54:25Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-19T09:54:25Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30414/3/Reuter_0-274268.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both imply desistance of the violation. The trial option might induce these parties to be less willing to contribute evidence to public cases. Private trials crowd out public prosecution and can have ambiguous effects on the number of enforcement errors.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30414/3/Reuter_0-274268.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:contributor>Reuter, Tim</dc:contributor>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen