On the relationship between strategic cultures and support for European defence : A comment on Irondelle, Mérand and Foucault

Abstract

Recent developments at its borders have reasserted the question whether and how the European Union (EU) should further its integration in the domain of foreign and security policy. Especially, the unfolding of the Ukraine crisis has led many observers, politicians and pundits alike, to put the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as its major sub‐component, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), back onto the agenda.1 The EU's (foreign policy) decision to offer and encourage an Association Agreement was a decisive element in triggering the internal turmoil in Ukraine; as events were unfolding, the degree and kind of involvement of the EU in the crisis was subjected to political debate; and the behaviour of Russia, which elicited concern in many Eastern European countries for their own security, posed security and defence questions the EU had not been confronted with since the rise of international terrorism, if ever. As the issue of European defence gains salience politically, the European public's preferences regarding this issue gains relevance as well. What are the determinants of public support for European defence, and what do citizens want it to look like, specifically?